



The article focuses on the role of banks in the financial crisis and compares the UK and 
Cyprus, since the banking sector of the latter was founded on the former’s model when it 
was a British colony. However, Cyprus’ financial sector has been influenced by its accession 
to the EMU, while the UK remains outside the eurozone. The article begins with the 
theoretical background, namely the ‘too-big-to-fail’ theory, the deficient banking corporate 
governance and the ineffective supervision of banks, and how they affected the UK and 
eurozone crises. Afterwards, the measures imposed by the UK government on its banking 
sector and the corresponding EU financial measures are discussed. A brief evaluation of the 
causes of the crisis in Cyprus follows. The article concludes that Cyprus can follow the UK’s 
example and focus its efforts on bank supervision to improve the financial industry and to 
avoid a future financial crisis. 
Keywords: banking supervision; regulation; too-big-to-fail; Twin Peak; European Banking 
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Introduction 
Financial crises, and especially bank crises, are not novel phenomenona, since banking 
systems are vulnerable across the world, irrespective of the type of financial system.1 
This vulnerability results from the very nature of a bank’s operation, which depends on 
liquidity due to deposits and investments, and which is threatened by the possibility 
of depositors collectively withdrawing their savings. The collapse of one bank can be 
likened to unbalancing a domino piece which ends up collapsing the whole system. 
Moreover, the recent global character of the financial environment increases the 
risk that a financial crisis is more likely to be forwarded from one state to another 
1 See Levine, R. (2002), ‘Bank-based or market-based financial systems: Which is better?’ NBER 
Working Paper Series, Working paper 9138 http://www.nber.org/papers/w9138, accessed 10 
December 2016.
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with unpredictable consequences. The decisive role of banks in the incidence and 
transmission of financial crises renders it essential to initially prevent or settle a banking 
crisis to resoluve a financial crisis.2
The objective of this study is to assess whether UK banking reforms could also 
apply to Cyprus in order to handle its current disastrous financial reality. The choice to 
examine Cyprus is because its legal system and banking industry were developed based 
on English foundations when Cyprus constituted part of the British Empire.3 As a 
result, the two countries share some pillars relating to the operation and legal regulation 
of banks and the financial system in general.4 It should not be ignored that Cyprus is 
a member of the eurozone, and therefore its financial sector is part of the EU banking 
union, with all the obligations and limitations that this membership encompasses. 
Thus, any recommendations made should take into account the limitations that the 
eurozone imposes, in the sense that Cyprus does not enjoy the same degree of freedom 
as the UK. It emerges that if Cyprus shifts its focus to bank supervision, following the 
example of the UK government, in conjunction with other recommended measures, 
the current situation of the island could improve. The conclusions present proposals 
aiming towards the solution of the existing financial turbulences in Cyprus and the 
prevention of similar situations in the future.
Following the defined purposes, this paper is organized accordingly: The first part 
is composed of a critical analysis of three of the most cited theories of how banks can 
initiate a financial crisis. These three main arguments are also examined as to whether 
they apply to the UK’s 2007 financial crash and the euro area’s crisis. The reform 
measures adopted in the UK and in the EU respectively will be presented in the second 
part. The case of Cyprus follows in the third part, which incorporates a timeline of the 
crisis on the island and an examination of its causes, taking into account the role of 
banks. The goal of the analysis conducted in the current paper is to discover whether 
and how the measures enforced in the UK could also be implemented in Cyprus. 
Additionally, the paper aims to explore what other measures could be adopted to deal 
with the crisis. 
The main point of this paper is to underline that a future financial crisis can only 
be avoided by improving risk management, enhancing corporate governance of banks, 
implementing effective resolution and support facilities, and establishing macro-
prudential oversight systems.
2 Andries, A. M. (2009), ‘What Role Have Banks in Financial Crises?’, Review of Economic and Business 
Studies, Vol. 2009, No. 3, pp. 149-159.
3 1878-1960.
4 After Cyprus’ accession to the EU in 2004, the government was obliged to accede to the EMU and to 
adopt the euro as its national currency. Cyprus joined the eurozone in 2008, thus, its banking system 
is also affected by European Central Bank policy.
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Theories on the Role of Banks in a Financial Crisis
Excessive loans, the growth of financial innovations and risky speculations, the relaxation 
of regulations and the ceaseless efforts of investors to gain large profits constituted 
signals for the global financial crisis of 2007.5 Among the various theories that have 
been developed, three were analyzed and supported: the ‘too big to fail’ theory, the 
deficient corporate governance of banks and the lack of effective supervision of banks.
Too Big to Fail (TBTF)
The phenomenon where the bankruptcy of one bank causes the bankruptcy of another 
if they constitute counterparties to each other is known as the ‘risk of contagion’. 
Particularly, at the EU level, the concept of the single market increases the contagion 
of bank failures due to the abolition of internal borders within the Union for the 
free movement of goods and services.6 Further, in an effort to promote the model of 
‘one market, one money’ in the context of the EMU,7 the eurozone countries became 
interdependent, and the risk of contagion became permanent. According to Snell, ‘[I]f 
there are question marks over the health of the banks of one country, markets quickly 
become worried about the financial institutions of other countries as well; if the ability 
of one Member State to stay within the euro is questioned, the markets quickly start to 
worry about the other countries.’8
If this risk of contagion is considered so high that the government is ready to 
take any measures to prevent it from failing, then the bank is regarded ‘too big to 
fail’ (TBTF).9 In 1984, C.T. Conover stated that US federal regulators would prevent 
the largest ‘money center banks’ from failing,10 thus a new regulatory principle was 
conceived, and according to Stewart McKinney, ‘We have a new kind of bank. It is 
called “too big to fail” and it is a wonderful bank’.11 The contribution of the TBTF 
5 Andries, A. M. (2009), ‘What Role Have Banks in Financial Crises?’, Review of Economic and Business 
Studies, Vol. 2009, No. 3, pp. 149-159
6 In the Commission White Paper (‘Completing the internal market’, COM(85) 310 final) the 
internal market is defined as ‘an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, 
persons, services and capital is ensured’.
7 Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, ‘One market, one money. An evaluation of 
the potential benefits and costs of forming an economic and monetary union’, European Economy 44, 
October 1990).
8 Snell, J. (2014), ‘The Internal Market and the Philosophies of Market Integration’ in Barnard C. and 
Peers S. (eds), European Union Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 300-324, at 314.
9 Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the 
United States (2011), The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Official Government Edition, p. 431.
10 Kaufman, G. G, (2004), ‘Too big to fail in U.S. banking: Quo vadis?’ in Benton, E. Gup (ed.) Too 
Big to Fail: Policy Practices in Government Bailouts, London: Praeger Publishers, pp. 153–167.
11 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2010), Preliminary Staff Report: Too-Big-to-Fail Financial 
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concept to the financial crisis was determinant, since a bank being labelled ‘TBTF’ 
could readily take risks which it would otherwise have avoided, and a government 
would be an implied pillar or guarantor to its creditors.12 This means that governments 
encourage banks to take risks that could pay large dividends and remuneration in 
periods of success, but could make losses which taxpayers would cover.13 Evidently, the 
financial crash beginning in 2007 led governments to take extraordinary measures to 
avoid the collapse of TBTF banks. Meanwhile, numerous smaller banks were allowed 
to go bankrupt because of their negligible importance to the economy. 
This vertical scale of support for the banking sector is clearly evident in the UK, 
where GBP 1,000 billion were spent as loans and equity investment, which is equal to 
two-thirds of the annual output of the country’s whole economy.14
According to Mervyn King, governments can deal with TBTF by either admitting 
that some banks are TBTF and diminishing the threat of their failure or by refusing 
to acknowledge that a bank is so important that the entire society would bear the 
costs of its failure.15 In essence, the first option is to reduce the possibility of a large 
bank collapsing by enforcing it to maintain capital requirements with regard to their 
risk-taking policies. Notably, Basel III requires banks to create a buffer against adverse 
consequences,16 which ‘would offer banks a greater ability to survive the strains of a 
crisis’,17 provide more protection for taxpayers and hopefully prevent the bank from 
failing, which could trigger government intervention.18 Although capital requirements 
lessen a bank's need for taxpayer support, it can still be made available, and the amount 
of capital and liquidity might change from day to day partly due to the variation of 
market expectations. In other words, even if contingent capital is reduced, when a 
TBTF bank is threatened by bankruptcy, the government would still provide some 
insurance to prevent it from failing. 
The second option shifts the focus to separating banking activities. The payment for 
goods and services by households and companies and the intermediate flow of savings 
Institutions, p. 7. Available at http://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-reports/2010-0831-
Governmental-Rescues.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
12 Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, speech to Scottish business organisations, 
Edinburgh, 20 October 2009. Available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/




16 The Basel Accord III 2011 implemented counter-cyclical capital buffers and systemic group buffers.
17 Barth, J. R., Prabha, A. and Swagel, P. (2012) ‘Just how big is the too-big-to-fail problem?’, (2012) 
Journal of Banking Regulation, Vol. 13, No. 4, pp. 265-299, at 280.
18 Yan, M., Hall, M. J. B. and Turner, P. (2012) ‘A cost-benefit analysis of Basel III: Some evidence from 
the UK’, International Review of Financial Analysis, Vol. 25, pp.73-82.
47
The Cypriot Banking Sector During the Financial Crisis and Its Reforms
to fund investment are essential activities for a country’s economy, therefore it is in the 
public’s interest to maintain them. In contrast, activities like proprietary trading entail 
greater risk. Thus, as was supported by John Kay, the provision of payment services 
could be separated from the creation of risky assets in order to protect deposits.19 
Alternatively, proprietary trading could be separated from retail banking in accordance 
with Paul Volcker’s view.20 Both views aim at limiting government guarantees to utility 
banking. Using the same rationale, the EU Commission proposed the structural 
reform of banks, which would prevent the biggest banks from engaging in proprietary 
trading21 by forcing these big banks to separate their risky trading activities from their 
deposit-taking business in order to protect depositors and preserve financial stability. 
However, separation of activities does not totally eliminate banks’ incentives, and 
governments will still support financial institutions which do not operate in the utility 
banking sector due to the harmful consequences for the entire economy should they 
fail.22 
Corporate Governance
Except for the issue of executive remuneration, corporate governance of banks was 
mostly ignored during the crisis23 until the OECD Steering Group on Corporate 
Governance authorized a study on some of the key areas of corporate governance of 
the banking industry.24 In 2009, the G2025 and the De Larosière Report conceded 
that corporate governance failures were one of the causes of the financial crisis.26 In 
19 Kay, J. (2009) ‘Too big to fail is too dumb an idea to keep’, Financial Times, 28 October 2009. 
Available at http://www.johnkay.com/2009/10/28/too-big-to-fail-is-too-dumb-an-idea-to-keep, 
accessed 10 December 2016.
20 G30 report, former Chairman of the Federal Reserve.
21 European Commission (2014b) ‘Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on structural measures improving the resilience of EU credit institutions’, COM/2014/043 
final - 2014/0020 (COD).
22 Speech by Mervyn King, Governor of the Bank of England, to Scottish business organisations, 
Edinburgh, 20 October 2009. Available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/archive/Documents/
historicpubs/speeches/2009/speech406.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
23 Mülbert, P. O. (2009) ‘Corporate Governance of Banks’, European Business Organization Law 
Review, Vol. 10, No.3, pp. 411–436.
24 OECD (2009) ‘Corporate Governance and the Financial Crisis: Key Findings and Main Messages’, 
pp. 1–58. Available at http://www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/43056196.
pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
25 Group of Twenty Working Group (2009) Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening 
Transparency. http://www.gfintegrity.org/storage/gfip/documents/g20%20working%20group%20
1%20report.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
26 High-Level group on Financial Supervision in the EU. (2009, February 25) The Report of the High-
Level Group on Financial Supervision in the EU. The group was chaired by Mr Jacques de Larosière: 
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the UK, Sir David Walker was mandated to independently evaluate that aspect in the 
its banking sector.27 According to the Walker Review, ‘the fact that different banks 
operating in the same geography, in the same financial and market environment and 
under the same regulatory arrangements generated such massively different outcomes 
can only be fully explained in terms of differences in the way they were run.’28
The lack of corporate governance during the last couple of decades has been 
illustrated by the collapse or near collapse of some large financial institutions 
worldwide,29 in which the main flaws were: bank boards that could not manage risk 
properly and could not control executive management; shareholders; stakeholders who 
remained passive while their boards decided to expand the operations; and a corporate 
culture which gave high remuneration for short-term profits. The same defects were 
recognized by the EU Commission and the De Larosière Report, which said, ‘[B]oards 
and senior management of financial firms failed to understand the characteristics of the 
new, highly complex financial products they were dealing with… The “herd instinct” 
prevailed too often driving many firms into a race to inflate profit without paying 
proper attention to risk. In many cases, board oversight or control of management 
was insufficient and non-executive directors “absent” or unable to challenge executive 
directors... Inadequate remuneration structures for both directors and traders led to 
excessive risk-taking and short-termism.’30
Considerable remuneration schemes, risk management, the fitness of the Combined 
Code on Corporate Governance, the composition and conduct of banks’ boards and 
the relationship with shareholders were the key areas of the Walker Review.
Regulation – Supervision
Arguably, many nations’ regulatory and supervisory agencies have not managed ‘to keep 
abreast of the rapidly evolving development of the financial industry and its myriad 
products and practices’.31 Slack regulations in the banking industry have significantly 
contributed to the development of high-risk lending and investment practices, which 
have led to financial turbulences. 
The de Larosière Report.
27 Walker, Sir D. (2009) ‘A review of Corporate Governance in UK Banks and Other Financial Industry 
Entities’, HM Treasury (The Walker Review).
28 Ibid.
29 Tomasic, Ro. and Akinbami, F. (2011) ‘Towards a new corporate governance after the global financial 
crisis’, International Company and Commercial Law Review, Vol. 22,No. 8, pp. 237-249.
30 European Commission (2010) ‘Corporate Governance in Financial Institutions: Lessons to be drawn 
from the current financial crisis, best practices’ SEC 669, 3.
31 Teakdong, K., Bonwoo, K. and Minsoo, P. (2013) ‘Role of financial regulation and innovation in the 
financial crisis’, (2013) Journal of Financial Stability, Vol. 9, No. 4, pp. 662-672.
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The financial crisis of 2007, described as the most calamitous in recent years, 
belongs to ‘a series of boom-bust-regulate-deregulate-boom-bust’ cycles.32 Lenders’ 
and borrowers’ ambitions to assume risk grow with the manifest force of the circular 
upturn, constituting the ‘boom’ process, which is ‘driven by leverage, speculation and 
rapid credit growth’, and which often climaxes in an expensive ‘bust’.33 Apart from the 
catalytic role of regulations, their implementation by supervisory authorities was also 
weakened. For instance, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) has been heavily 
criticised for its risk-based approach to regulation after UK banks failed and were 
subsequently nationalised.34 The supervisory authorities of Iceland and Ireland were 
similarly disreputable when their banking sectors had to be dismantled.35 Thousands 
of Irish protested against the public sector’s spending cuts in order to save Anglo Irish 
Bank, which was the victim of deficient corporate governance.36
The regulatory structure of the UK was tripartite, consisting of the FSA, which was 
the foundation of this system and the supervisory body for banks, the HM Treasury 
and the Central Bank. The FSA’s responsibilities were the regulation and prudential 
supervision of financial institutions. The HM Treasury was authorized to oversee the 
whole regulatory structure and to approve any support operation in case of financial 
crisis. Finally, the Central Bank was mandated to preserve steady monetary and 
financial systems.
Despite the initial financial stability achieved by the newborn tripartite system, 
the collapse of Northern Rock Bank in September 2007 indicated there was weak 
supervision by the FSA. More importantly, it was unclear which regulatory body was 
responsible to immediately handle the crisis.37 The subsequent bankruptcies of RBS 
and Lloyds Bank confirmed the shortcomings of that system.
The Turner Review, being considered the most thorough analysis of these financial 
turbulences, classified several factors which contributed to the crisis,38 among which 
32 O’Brien, J. (2010) ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: Enhancing Integrity through Design’, Sydney 
Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 63-85.
33 White, W.R. (2014) ‘The Prudential Regulation of Financial Institutions: Why Regulatory Responses 
to the Crisis Might Not Prove Sufficient’, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, No.1108, 
OECD Publishing.
34 O’Brien J. (2010), ‘The Future of Financial Regulation: Enhancing Integrity through Design’, Sydney 
Law Review, Vol. 31, No. 1, pp. 63-85.
35 International Monetary Fund (2009), ‘Crisis Creates Testing Times for Europe’s Policymakers’, IMF 
Survey Magazine. Available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2009/CAR061009A.
htm, accessed 10 December 2016.
36 Wall M. and Collins S. (2009), ‘Change to Cuts Strategy Ruled Out as Protests Seek “Fairer” Way’, 
Irish Times (Dublin), 7 November 2009.
37 Cox, L., Dorudi, B., et al. (2012) ‘United Kingdom regulatory reform: emergence of the twin peaks’, 
Compliance Officer Bulletin, Vol. 95, pp. 1-33.
38 FSA (2009) The Turner Review, a regulatory response to the global banking crisis. London: FSA.
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were macro-economic imbalances, financial innovation without social worth and 
serious flaws in decisive bank capital and liquidity regulations. The Review also 
included factors such as the expansive involvement of commercial banks in trading 
activities, which lowered confidence in the banking system, and insufficient capital 
buffers, which had not allowed banks to continue their lending activities since the 
downturn.39
Following the identification of the crisis’ causes, the Turner Review made numerous 
recommendations for improving the regulatory system and preventing future crises. In 
essence, it strongly recommended the FSA be reconstructed to primarily supervise 
business strategies and the system-wide risks of banks, and then to supervise their 
internal processes and structures, as ‘the approach has to build on a system-wide 
perspective: failure to look at the big picture was far more important to the origins of 
the crisis than any specific failures in supervising individual firms.’40
The UK Reform Measures
The aforementioned theories have obliged the UK government to acknowledge the 
urgency to reform the existing banking industry regime and to decide how to handle 
these arguments.
Taking into consideration the Turner Review, the UK government decided to 
abolish the FSA,41 and in his 2011 Mansion House speech, Chancellor George Osborne 
declared that the original tripartite system belonged to the past.42 Three years later, on 
1 April 2013, the FSA was replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and 
the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), which were mandated to observe banks’ 
health and to supervise financial institutions’ conduct. Moreover, the Financial Policy 
Committee was established within the Bank of England to diagnose and deal with 
financial risks to the system’s stability.
In essence, the FCA has inherited most of the Financial Services Authority’s tasks 
to regulate market conduct, including monitoring all firms’ conduct in relation to retail 








43 Perry, J., Moulton, R. et al. (2011) ‘The new UK regulatory landscape’, Compliance Officer Bulletin, 
Vol. 84, pp. 1-33.
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FCA’s objective is to strengthen ‘confidence in the UK financial system by facilitating 
efficiency and choice in services, securing an appropriate degree of consumer protection, 
and protecting and enhancing the integrity of the UK financial system’.44 The PRA, a 
separate legal entity and subsidiary of the Bank of England, assumes responsibility over 
the micro-prudential regulation and daily supervision of those financial institutions 
that are subject to significant prudential regulation, namely banks, insurers and major 
investment firms.45 The fundamental objective of this authority is to promote ‘the 
stable and prudent operation of the financial system through the effective regulation 
of financial firms, in a way that minimizes the disruption caused by any firms that 
do fail’.46 Finally, the FPC exercises macro-prudential regulation to strike a balance 
between financial stability and sustainable economic development.47 The FPC’s 
objectives are to improve financial stability by improving the flexibility of the financial 
system, identifying its vulnerabilities, and improving macroeconomic stability.48
The new structure of the regulatory system has given rise to certain concerns, 
particularly with regard to the danger of creating ‘regulatory underlap’ and 
duplication.49 Remarkably, Hector Saints commented that ‘any structure which 
is anything other than a monolithic organisation, across the whole spectrum of 
regulation, is going to have fault lines. And where you have a fault line, you have 
a coordination risk’.50 In response to these arguments, the government emphasised 
that the FCA and the PRA enjoy the same status and flexibility to engage with 
each other,51 but if they disagree, the PRA would prevail and prevent the FCA from 
exercising a function if there is a high risk a firm could fail.
44 HM Treasury (2011) ‘A new approach to financial regulation: building a stronger system’, p. 5. 
Available at  https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81411/
consult_newfinancial_regulation170211.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.





50 Thomson Reuters Newsmaker Event, December 2010. Available at http://live.reuters.com/Event/
TRNewsmaker?Page=0, accessed 10 December 2016.
51 HM Treasury (2011) ‘A new approach to financial regulation: building a stronger system’. Available 
at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/81411/consult_
newfinancial_regulation170211.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
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The EU Approach
While the UK attributed the failure of its financial sector primarily to improper and 
inadequate supervision of banks and the market in its entirety, the EU preferred a 
different tack by prioritising ‘the increased control of the market by extending the 
scope of regulation; curbing specific “undesirable” behaviours; protecting consumers 
and taxpayers; and enhancing eurozone solidarity’.52 The focus shifted to protecting 
consumers and taxpayers rather than re-empowering market forces; thus, instead of 
the EU reviewing supervisory measures, it reinforced the regulatory system initially.
Among the Union’s responses to the crisis, including instances of quick intervention 
to stabilise some euro countries that were heavily affected,53 and measures of budgetary 
surveillance and economic coordination,54 various reforms were made to create a more 
powerful and steadier financial framework, and a so-called European banking union.55 
The idea of creating a European banking union was first introduced by the President of 
the EU Council in June 2012,56 consisting of three pillars, namely a ‘single supervisory 
mechanism’, a harmonized recovery and resolution framework and a common deposit 
guarantee scheme for all the eurozone states. 
A. Single Supervision Mechanism (SSM)
Article 127(1) TFEU establishes that the primary objective of the European 
System of Central Banks is the maintenance of price stability, and, for this purpose, 
the range of powers of the ECB includes setting interest rates and suppling liquidity to 
the banking system. In addition to these tasks, in 2013, the ECB became responsible 
for the prudential supervision of banks and other financial institutions57 and it now 
52 Europe Economics (2014) ‘EU Financial Regulation: A report for Business for Britain’, p. 24. 
Available at http://forbritain.org/EUFinancialReg.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
53 Loan facilities, such as the European Financial Stability Mechanism and the European Financial 
Stability Fund, were created to deal with the urgent sovereignty debt crises of Ireland and Greece in 
2010.
54 The so-called Six Pack package of measures was adopted in November 2011 to improve budgetary 
surveillance and economic policies. That surveillance was further strengthened in May 2013 by the 
Two-Pack. Moreover the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance was entered into force on 
1 January 2013 dealing with budgetary discipline, economic convergence and cooperation and euro 
governance. 
55 See Hinarejos, A. (2014), ‘Economic and Monetary Union’ in Integration’, in Barnard, C. and Peers, 
S. (eds), European Union Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 567-590.
56 President of the European Council (2012 June 26) ‘Towards a Genuine Economic and Monetary 
Union’. Available at: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/focuson/crisis/documents/131201_
en.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
57 Regulation 1024/2013 conferring specific tasks on the European Central Bank concerning policies 
relating to the prudential supervision of credit institutions [2013] OJ 2 287/63, hereinafter SSM 
Regulation.
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supervises approximately 150 eurozone credit institutions, which is equivalent to 80% 
of the banking assets in the euro area. The remaining banks, being regarded as ‘less 
significant’, are still supervised by their national competent authorities (NCAs).58 
The criteria for distinguishing ‘significant’ from ‘less significant’ banks are their size, 
importance for the economy of the Member State or the entire Union, the volume of 
their cross-border activities (if any) and the ranking amongst the three most important 
banks in the relevant Member State.59 Such distinctions clearly reflect the Union’s 
application of the TBTF theory. 
Under the SSM, the ECB and the NCAs now share prudential supervision of 
banks, co-sharing in some areas and allocating exclusive competences in others. In 
particular, NCAs remain responsible for supervising bodies which are not covered by 
the EU’s legal definition of credit institutions,60 supervising payment services, consumer 
protection, protecting against money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as 
the ‘low-level’ aspects of prudential supervision such as dealing with matters of credit 
institutions’ establishment and provision of services, supervising credit institutions 
from non-EU countries with branches or cross-border services within the Union, and 
assisting the ECB in its supervisory role. 
The ECB’s new role could be characterized as either increasing or weakening 
integration, since banking union introduces a level of integration for the banking 
sector within the eurozone.61
B. Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM)
In 2013 the European Commission drafted a regulation on uniform procedures for 
bank resolution within the Eurozone62 to put nearly solvent banks into resolution ‘with 
minimal costs to taxpayers and to the broader economy’.63 This ‘bail-in’ method shares 
the burden of covering the losses and resolving a failing bank among shareholders, 
creditors and unsecured depositors. The SRM applies only to the banks that are also 
covered by the SSM, thus authorities on the same level perform supervision and 
management. In particular, the resolution of these ‘significant’ banks is transferred 
58 SSM Regulation, Article 6.
59 SSM Regulation, Article 6(4).
60 Though they might be supervised as credit institutions under national law.
61 Andenas, M. and Chiu, I. H-Y (2013), ‘Financial stability and legal integration in financial 
regulation’, European Law Review, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 335-359.
62 European Commission (2013) ‘Proposal for a Regulation establishing uniform rules and uniform 
procedures for the resolution of credit institutions and certain investment firms in the framework 
of a Single Resolution Mechanism and a Single Bank Resolution Fund and amending Regulation 
1093/2010’ COM(2013) 520.
63 Alexander, K. (2015) ‘European Banking Union: a legal and institutional analysis of the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism and the Single Resolution Mechanism’, European Law Review, Vol. 40, No. 
2, p. 156.
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from the national to the European level, and the ‘less significant’ credit institutions 
are still managed by their national resolution authorities (NRAs). Consequently, the 
consistency of the approach towards significant banks is ensured and the integrity of 
the single market is reinforced. 
Under the SRM, which has been in full force from 1 January 2016, a Single 
Resolution Board (SRB) was established to achieve ‘a coherent and uniform approach’ 
to bank resolution, and a Single Resolution Fund was created with contributions from 
the banks that are under the scope of the SRM. The use of the bail-in tool depends on 
the discretion of the SRB, since the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive64 provides 
for the adoption of early intervention resolution methods. This function of the SRB 
provides the Union authorities with a methodical means to manage failures of banks 
and other financial institutions, which constitutes one of the SRM’s objectives. 
C. Deposit Guarantee Scheme
Regarding the third pillar of the EBU, the Deposit Guarantee Scheme Directive 
of 201465 provides for the protection of €100,000 of each retail depositor, with banks 
increasing contributions to a deposit guarantee fund in each State66 in the event of a 
bank’s resolution.67
Generally, implementing the SSM and the SRM, in the context of harmonized 
banking rules, intends to complete the EMU and ensure financial stability. Furthermore, 
the bail-in tool puts ‘an end to the era of massive bailouts paid by taxpayers’68 and 
enhances confidence in the banking industry and in the eurozone as a whole. Those 
purposes are achieved when the European banking union transmits the sovereignty 
from the national authorities of Member States to Union institutions in the sensitive 
area of banking supervision and resolution. 
The Case of Cyprus
In March 2013, Cyprus dominated the news worldwide when the Eurogroup and the 
President of the Republic of Cyprus reached an agreement that would impose a bail-in 
of all insured and uninsured depositors in all banks of the country.69 Such agreement 
64 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing 
a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms [2014] OJ 2 
173/190.
65 Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes [2014] OJ 2 173/149I
66 Ibid. Article 10
67 Ibid. Article 6.
68 European Commission (2014) ‘Banking Union: Restoring financial stability in the Eurozone’, p. 2.
69 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus (2013 March 16). Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/136487.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
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was described as ‘a one-off, extraordinary measure that will not be repeated under 
any circumstances.’70 However, the phenomenal financial crisis did not come out of 
the blue, rather it was the result of several failures. ‘The combination of loose fiscal 
policies, ineffective supervision and the lack of formal arrangements to deal with a 
crisis opened the way to catastrophe’.71 The Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) appointed 
an Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector to identify 
weaknesses of the national banking system and to recommend ways to enhance the 
system’s growth, stability and competitiveness.72
At the national policy level, the risk involved in operating a banking industry of 
such a size had not been properly estimated. In fact, banks were not well run and their 
activities lacked prudence, but the public erroneously believed that banks, through their 
international business, were contributing to the state’s wealth. The highlight of this 
attitude was the lack of any interest towards formulating mechanisms to deal with a 
future financial crisis. The proof of that devaluation of risk was that Cyprus’ two biggest 
domestic banks, the Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank (Laiki Bank), were 
highly exposed to Greek debt. Specifically, they held among the greatest proportions 
of Greek bonds in Europe and operated bank branches and subsidiaries in Greece. This 
disproportionate amount of Greek bonds held by the two aforementioned banks73 could 
be partly attributed to the ECB, which allowed eurozone commercial banks to hold 
unlimited amounts of perilous government bonds.74 The ECB’s policy, in conjunction 
with the imprudent culture of the Cyprus’ banking sector, resulted in Cypriot banks 
expanding to Greece between 2009 and 2010, which was arguably the worst time, since 
Greece was already in a deep recession, and financial assistance from international lenders 
was inevitable. Evidently, the amount of Greek bonds and companies held by Cyprus 
banks in 2010 exceeded 2.5 times the Cyprus’ GDP.75
The fact that banks were not prevented from pursuing those expanding and 
precarious activities indicates regulatory weaknesses.76 Generally, the Central Bank 
70 Ministry of Finance (2013 March 18) Agreement for Financial Assistance to 
the Republic of Cyprus. Available at http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/mof.nsf/All/
BB670607715A44D6C2257B3200368FE9/$file/ agreemenfinancialassistance.pdf, accessed 10 
December 2016.
71 Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector (October 2013) Final Report 
and Recommendations, p. 31.
72 See http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=12561&lang=en, accessed 10 April 2017.
73 Namely Greek government bonds worth around €6 billion.
74 Ioannou, Ch. and Emilianides, A. (2013) ‘Πώς και γιατί η Κύπρος βυθίστηκε στην κρίση: Τα 
πραγματικά αίτια και οι ευθύνες’, Foreign Affairs, The Hellenic Edition. Available at http://www.
foreignaffairs.gr/articles/69205/xristina-ioannoy-kai-axilleas-aimilianidis/pos-kai-giati-i-kypros-
bythistike-stin-krisi?page=show, accessed 10 December 2016.
75 Ibid.
76 Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector (2013 October) Final Report 
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of Cyprus (CBC) has to conduct ‘micro-prudential supervision of banks, macro-
prudential supervision, payment, clearing and settlement systems oversight and by 
acting as lender of last resort or through the resolution of distressed banks’.77 However, 
the custodian of national financial stability proved unable to monitor banking risks. 
Nevertheless, at this stage, it should be underlined that the CBC cannot assume all 
responsibility, because the European Banking Authority (EBA) undertook the annual 
stress test in 2011 and determined that Cypriot banks had sufficient capital to withstand 
a financial crisis78 while being aware of the near total collapse of the Greek economy 
and that Cypriot banks had purchased so many Greek bonds. The CBC’s actions and 
omissions further challenged the independence of banking supervision and the lack of 
CBC’s accountability to the government for its supervisory functions. Generally, the 
TFEU and the Protocol on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and 
of the European Central Bank79 preserve CBC’s independence.80 Just as EU law gives 
the CBC independence over monetary policy, national law protects its supervisory 
role.81 After the country’s accession to the EMU, the CBC’s duty of establishing 
and implementing monetary policy was delegated to the ECB, and now the CBC’s 
governor participates in the General Council and the Governing Council of the ECB 
as a permanent and ex officio member with the governors of all the other national 
central banks in the EU.82
Among the causes of the crisis in Cyprus was also the defective corporate governance 
of banks. Arguably, the boards of the country’s big banks failed to implement 
appropriate mechanisms and procedures for monitoring risk and controlling executive 
directors. ‘A culture of deference rather than challenge prevailed in the face of 
domineering chief executives who increasingly ignored their boards and bypassed what 
controls did exist’.83 That kind of attitude was more perceptible in Laiki Bank and 
and Recommendations, pp. 1-118.
77 Central Bank of Cyprus, https://www.centralbank.cy/en//financial-stability/macroprudential-
strategy (accessed 10 December 2016).
78 See European Banking Authority, 2011 EU-wide stress test results. Available at http://www.eba.
europa.eu/risk-analysis-and-data/eu-wide-stress-testing/2011/results and http://www.centralbank.
gov.cy/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=11847&lang=en, accessed 10 December 2016.
79 Protocol (No 4) on the Statute of the European System of Central Banks and the European Central 
Bank as annexed to the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union [2010] OJ 83/01, Chapter 3, Art.7.
80 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Art.130 [2012] OJ 
C326/01.
81 Central Bank of Cyprus Laws of 2002-2007, part 2 section 7.
82 Core principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 
September 1997.
83 Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector (October 2013) Final Report 
and Recommendations, p. 25.
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the Bank of Cyprus, whose mere objective was to increase income so as to fund their 
expansive activities and ‘meet their bonus targets’.84 Apart from ensuring their bonuses, 
the directors’ conflicting interests further injured the integrity and impartiality of the 
boards. 
Remarkably, cooperative societies’ position with regards their harmonization with 
EU law requirements remained unclear for many years. Initially, cooperatives did 
not constitute credit institutions so they were not bound by the relevant Banking 
Directive,85 which the banks had to implement after the country acceded to the EU in 
2004. After long negotiations, it was decided that cooperatives should fully comply with 
EU law, and thus, the Cooperative Societies Law, which regulates the establishment 
and operation of cooperative banks, was appropriately amended to implement the 
acquis communautaire in relation to credit institutions.86
The weaknesses of the national banking system should be considered together with 
EU legislation on this matter, which was incomplete at that time. In essence, while 
the first signals of the financial crisis appeared in the country, EU legislation regarding 
corporate governance and bank supervision was still being formulated. Notably, the 
SSM and the SRM were established in 2013 and 2015 respectively, thus, it could not 
be argued that Cyprus made tragic omissions, but rather that the EU framework was 
not comprehensive at that time, although it was necessary due to the failure of the 
corresponding national frameworks. 
The Troika first proposed that ‘all bank deposits to bear the brunt of the haircut’,87 
obliging all depositors in Cyprus to save their economy by handing over their own assets. 
Such a measure is unprecedented in the history of modern banking. Paradoxically, while 
other countries were given a debt haircut, Cyprus was given a deposit haircut, with it 
being presented as necessary due to the small number of bondholders in Cypriot banks 
who were unable to assume all the losses on their own.88 The Eurogroup president 
commented, ‘Cyprus is a specific case with exceptional challenges’.89 The relevant 
Eurogoup statement explained that the measures included ‘the introduction of an up 
front one-off stability levy applicable to resident and non-resident depositors... the 
84 Ibid.
85 Directive 2000/12/EC relating to the taking up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions 
[2000] OJ 2 126/1.
86 Cooperative Societies Law (No. 22 of 1985 and 68 of 1987 as amended), https://tinyurl.com/
y8h5v7vc, accessed 10 December 2016.
87 Georgiou, G. C. (2013), ‘Cyprus’s Financial Crisis and the Threat to the Euro’, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 56-73.
88 Ibid.
89 Statement by the Eurogroup President on Cyprus (25 March 2013). Available at http://www.
consilium.europa.eu/press/press-releases/2013/03/pdf/Statement-by-the-Eurogroup-President-on-
Cyprus/, accessed 10 December 2016.
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increase of the withholding tax on capital income, a restructuring and recapitalisation 
of banks, an increase of the statutory corporate income tax rate and a bail-in of 
junior bondholders’.90 A record 12-day banking holiday and rigorous capital controls 
followed.91
After the Cypriot Parliament rejected the first proposal, ‘the race was on to reach 
a solution to what was turning out to be a bigger problem than any of the negotiating 
parties had bargained for’.92 The Eurogroup’s take-it-or-leave-it approach compelled 
the government to accept the terms of a revised bailout on 25 March 2013. What 
changed was that a haircut would be imposed only on Laiki Bank and Bank of Cyprus 
depositors, and deposits of less than 100,000 euros would be guaranteed.93 Laiki Bank 
was put under resolution, so it was forced to close and to be replaced by a ‘good 
bank’ and a ‘bad bank’. As with Northern Rock Bank, the bad bank absorbed all toxic 
assets, that is, deposits of more than 100,000 euros, and non-performing loans. The 
good bank consisted of all the guaranteed deposits and became a part of the Bank 
of Cyprus. In addition, Laiki’s ELA was restructured and downsized, and its Greek 
branches ceased operation. 
Admittedly, the rescue package prevented the entire country from defaulting. 
However, its effects went ‘well beyond the shores of this small island nation’.94 The idea 
of a state guarantee for bank deposits first appeared in 1929 when the US stock market 
crashed and banks failed.95 A similar mechanism applies in the EU.96 Although the 
existence of such mechanisms illustrates that maintaining banking confidence lies at 
the heart of banking authorities worldwide, Cyprus’ bailout agreement seems to have 
destroyed this pillar of modern banking, since the savings of a considerable number of 
depositors were uninsured by the state and were consequently lost.97 In fact, the bail-in 
90 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus (16 March 2013). Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
en/press/press-releases/2016/03/07/eurogroup-statement-cyprus/#. accessed 10 December 2016.
91 Treanor, J., Smith, H. and Moulds, J. (2013), ‘Cyprus banks reopen – but stock exchange will 
remain closed’, The Guardian, http://www.theguardian.com/business/2013/mar/28/cyprus-reopen-
banks-stock-market-closed (accessed 10 December 2016). In July 2015, Greek banks broke a world 
record with a 3-week banking holiday and strict capital controls until Greece reached a new bailout 
deal with Troika.
92 Georgiou, G. C. (2013), ‘Cyprus’s Financial Crisis and the Threat to the Euro’, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 63.
93 Eurogroup Statement on Cyprus (25 March 2013). Available at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/
uedocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/136487.pdf accessed 10 December 2016.
94 Georgiou, G. C. (2013) ‘Cyprus’s Financial Crisis and the Threat to the Euro’, Mediterranean 
Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3, p. 66. 
95 FDIC.gov, Timeline, available at http://www.fdic.gov/about/history/timeline/1920s.html, accessed 
10 December 2016.
96 In the EU, bank deposits are guaranteed up to 100,000 euros per account.
97 Georgiou G. C. (2013) ‘Cyprus’s Financial Crisis and the Threat to the Euro’, pp. 56-73.
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tool used in Cyprus expedited the finalisation of the Deposit Guarantee Scheme, with 
the relevant directive being implemented one year later,98 and subsequently, the bail-in 
tool was introduced as a concept in EU legislation.99 Banking confidence was further 
damaged because transferring the burden of rescuing a bank to the depositors creates 
uncertainty as to whether deposits have become money available to taxpayers’ money 
whenever there are emergency conditions. As long as governments can legally annul 
the guarantee of deposits, then ‘nobody’s money is safe from the tax collector’.100 In 
other words, the seizure of private property ad lib would be legally allowed. 
The reaction of financial observers in the US was also intense, as for the first time 
in history ‘someone has found the courage to execute a credible solution to large bank 
failure that is not backstopped by taxpayers’.101 While the US government preferred 
to rescue their banks during the crisis of 2007 by applying the TBTF theory, the 
Eurogroup supported that Cyprus’ largest banks were not worth rescuing102 since they 
could not bring down the whole eurozone system. In particular, the Eurogroup did not 
agree that Cyprus’ banks fell under the EU’s TBTF category, even if the two banks with 
the greater risk of failing were the largest of the island. However, the fact that these two 
banks were forced to apply such measures, irrespective of their size and importance for 
the local economy, demonstrates that the TBTF principle can be abandoned. It could 
be concluded that if a small and economically weak country has the courage to subject 
its two largest banks to such strong measures, the same process could be used in any 
other large and economically well developed country.
Recommendations for Cyprus
The temporary nature of the rescue package, which aimed at preventing the whole 
country from collapsing, renders the radical reform of Cyprus’ banking sector necessary. 
However, the Memorandum of Understanding did not operate as a proposal for 
permanent reform of Cyprus’ banking industry, but focused only on the management 
of the particular crisis, and therefore a complete reconsideration of the banking system 
within the EU context is urgent so to prevent similar crises in the future. Undeniably, 
98 Directive 2014/49/EU on deposit guarantee schemes [2014] OJ 2 173/149 was implemented on 16 
April 2014.
99 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing 
a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms [2014] OJ 2 
173/190 was implemented on 15 May 2014.
100 Georgiou, G. C. (2013) ‘Cyprus’s Financial Crisis and the Threat to the Euro’, p. 67.
101 Bennetts, L. (2013) ‘The Cyprus ‘Bail-In’ Exposes as ‘Too Big To Fail’ As All Too Timid’, Forbes. 
Available at http://www.forbes.com/sites/realspin/2013/04/18/the-cyprus-bail-in-exposes-too-big-
to-fail-as-all-too-timid/, accessed 10 December 2016.
102 Georgiou, G. C. (2013) ‘Cyprus’s Financial Crisis and the Threat to the Euro’, pp. 56-73.
60
The Cyprus Review (Vol. 29, 2017)
Cyprus should implement EU recommendations regarding corporate governance of 
banks and cooperate effectively with EU authorities on bank supervision within the 
framework of the European banking union to strengthen its banking sector to achieve 
financial stability and to avoid a recurrence of the current financial crash.
Cyprus, acting within the EBU framework, can follow the example of the UK, 
which commenced its reform by restructuring bank supervision, and can consider 
proposals for improving its financial supervisory structure. Cyprus legislation authorizes 
the CBC to be the competent authority to supervise and license banks103 in accordance 
with the guidelines issued by the EBA, and the Directions and Regulations adopted by 
the EU. Until recently, banks were supervised by the CBC,104 and cooperative credit 
institutions were supervised by the Cooperative Societies’ Supervision and Development 
Authority.105 Insurance companies are under the responsibility of the Superintendent 
of Insurance,106 investment firms are monitored by the Cyprus Securities and Exchange 
Commission,107 and firms which deal with pension funds fall under the supervision of 
the Registrar of Occupation Retirement Benefit Funds.108 The implementation of the 
SSM Regulation introduced some changes to the national system of supervision, and 
now, the Bank of Cyprus, the Cooperative Central Bank, the Hellenic Bank and the 
Russian Commercial Bank (RCB) are supervised by the ECB. The IMF characterised 
the former structure as fragmented and that the supervision of domestic financial 
institutions could not be effective and unified.109
It is interesting to examine whether the ‘twin peaks’ model that was adopted in the 
UK would be viable in Cyprus. Following the UK’s example, banking regulation could 
be divided into monitoring banks’ conduct, which is done by the FCA, and prudential 
supervision, which is the responsibility of the PRA. The former would deal with banks’ 
relationship with their retail customers and their general market conduct, and the latter 
would administer the soundness of the financial system. However, the establishment 
103 Central Bank of Cyprus Law 2002-2007, Banking Law 1997-2009
104 Central Bank of Cyprus, https://www.centralbank.cy/en/home, accessed 10 December 2016.
105 Ministry of Energy, Commerce, Industry and Tourism, ‘Cooperative Societies’ Supervision and 
Development Authority’. Available at http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/dmlinspection_en/
dmlinspection_en?OpenDocument, accessed 10 December 2016.
106 Ministry of Finance, ‘Insurance Companies Control Service’. Available at http://mof.gov.cy/en/
directorates-units/insurance-companies-control-service, accessed 10 December 2016.
107 Cyprus Securities and Exchange Commission, https://www.cysec.gov.cy/el-GR/
home/?aspxerrorpath=/default_en.aspx/, accessed 10 December 2016.
108 Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance (n.d.) ‘Occupational Retirement Benefit Funds’. Available 
at http://www.mlsi.gov.cy/mlsi/sid/sidv2.nsf/page43_en/page43_en?OpenDocument, accessed 10 
December 2016.
109 Orphanides, A. and Syrichas, G. (2012) The Cyprus Economy: Historical Review, Prospects, Challenges, 
Central Bank of Cyprus. Available at http://www.centralbank.gov.cy/media/pdf/CBC_book_
EN.pdf, accessed 10 December 2016.
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of two peaks of regulation ‘would be excessive in a country of Cyprus’ size and would 
also create an additional regulatory interface for the firms themselves’.110 A country’s 
size is defined in terms of its banking industry and its general economy. It is necessary 
to ensure that the country’s supervisory authorities deal with banks’ conduct and 
their micro-prudential regulation and daily supervision. However, the size of Cyprus’ 
economy enables the same authority to perform both functions.
Focusing on restructuring its supervisory mechanism could constitute the best 
approach for Cyprus to follow. Although various models are used worldwide, the 
most suitable and streamlined for Cyprus is the integrated structure. Under the Single 
Supervisory Mechanism, both the ECB and the CBC could assume the responsibilities 
of the four existing components of the supervisory system, thus becoming more 
efficient and strict. This authority must have complete legal and financial independence 
to supervise banks’ conduct and compliance with prudential rules, such as the FCA 
and the PRA have in the UK. The ‘one-stop-shop’ model of financial supervision is 
already supported by numerous countries111 as a means to avoid any overlap between 
various authorities and to provide the regulators with a thorough view of a country’s 
financial sector. Moreover, it is argued that countries like the US, which have specialist 
supervisors, lack efficiency and effectiveness. Furthermore, a sole supervisory authority 
could operate more independently and thus provide ‘a bulwark against political 
interference’.112
After improving bank supervision, Cyprus must also implement other 
recommendations. Most importantly, the country should reevaluate its philosophy 
regarding the role of banks and financial services. Cyprus’ dependency on its banking 
system for financial services is extraordinarily high, and it is essential that the government 
implement a financial services strategy to guarantee the banking industry’s continuous 
development. By fully appreciate their dependency on banks, the government will be 
able to monitor their operations more carefully. On the other hand, the government 
must quickly reinforce the banking system’s autonomy. ‘Cultural change of this kind 
would transform the banking industry in all the necessary ways, by delivering better 
governance, sounder banks, and greater trust internationally’.113
Furthermore, the corporate governance of banks should be improved to prevent 
boards from mismanaging banks and rewarding excessive bonuses to those who take 
excessive risks. Raising the standards of bank management should include ensuring 
that banks’ boards of directors are independent, selecting directors on a merit basis, 
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increasing the number of non-executive directors to counterbalance the executive 
directors, and regularly assessing the boards’ performance.114
Finally, the Cypriot government could focus on effectively implementing the 
principles established in the Basel III framework which augment regulation and risk 
management of the banking industry. In that way it can enhance the banks’ ability 
‘to absorb shocks arising from financial and economic stress whatever the source, 
improve risk management and governance and strengthen banks’ transparency and 
disclosures’.115 In practice, banks must raise their capital levels and curtail their debt 
levels, and macro-prudential regulation must ensure that the banking sector can 
tolerate higher risks, and micro-prudential regulation must become more rigorous in 
times of stress. 
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